AUSTRALIAN EXTERNAL RELATIONS: SPECIAL RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

 

Devania Anesya/ 070810535

Australia has a strategic location and geography since the mid-1980s. Its location isolated from world trouble spots and the fact that it is an island continent are said to provide certain strategic and tactical advantages which is contributed to its defensibility. The Labour government’s 1987 defense White Paper noted that Australia… naturally protected by vast ocean surrounds and the inhospitable tracts of our own country to the north and north-west… combine to provide with natural defences against conventional attack (Beazley, 1987).

The 1994 defence White Paper again warned that at some time in the future armed force could be used against us and (so)… we need to be prepared to meet it (White Paper, 1994).  This is in spite of the fact that white Australia has never seriously been threatened has said we are unlikely to be for at least the foreseeable future. Such continuing, obsessive, and arguably, irrational fear of military attack has its root in white Australia’s own history and experiences.

Australia has always been a frightened country (Renouf, 1979 and Pons, 1994) by the constant fear of attack or conquest by external and predominantly Asian countries. Australia beliefs that she cannot defend herself against these perceived threats, that’s why she led Australia’s policy makers to look to great and powerful friend for reassurance and protection.  As a consequence, Australia has become a dependent ally (Bell, 1988), borrowing from and ever supportive of the policies and practices of its principal benefactors, and ready to dispatch military forces overseas in support of their imperial objectives (Andrews, 1979; Millar, 1991; and Watt, 1968).

The notion of keeping Australia safe created by maintaining its surrounding region as an Anglo-Australian and later United States-Australian preserve was not restricted to colonial times. It is important to remember that when United States dominance was arguably most legitimate, constructive, and benign in the first couple of decades after the Second World War, it was widely perceived to have assumed a hegemonic position that transcended national interest to provide international public good (Kindleberger, 1973).

Since the Second World War, relations with United States have assumed an increasingly prominent position in the construction of economic and security policies in Australia. Sentiment toward the United States has generally been positive. However, self declared ‘war on terrorism’ of United States and Australia’s participation in a conflict with Iraq in particular, has subjected the relationship to widespread scrutiny and criticism. The Australian Labor Party (ALP) has moved to qualify its support, some senior Labor figures have launched fairly splenetic attack on American foreign policy and the Howard government’ support of it (Price, Lewis, and Kerin, 2003).

Even before 11 September 2001 and the subsequent reordering of American foreign policy, the Howard government’s expectations about what the bilateral relationship with the United States could deliver looked likely to prove a triumph of hope over experience: a glance at the recent historical record suggested that the benefits likely to accrue to Australia were likely to be the modest at best. But if we examine closer, more exclusive relationship with the United States may have a significant and generally negative impact on Australia’s long term place in the region, its economic position, its political independence, and even domestic security.

In economic relations with United States, Australia is one of a select band of countries that actually runs a trade deficit with the United States. While American markets have played a pivotal role in underpinning the export-led development of much of region and more sustaining a faltering global economy through seemingly insatiable consumer-led demand, Australia has not been a major beneficiary of either of these developments. There is a range of visible and invisible trade barriers that discriminate against Australian-based producers (Beeson, 2003).

Australia-New Zealand-US alliance, ANZUS was plainly a gesture loaded symbolic than strategic significance, as Australia could add nothing material to America’s overwhelming and increasing military dominance (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002) but it was a gesture that continued an Australian tradition with a respected heritage. Difficult to say anything sensible about the intelligence benefits but with the sort of threat Australians obviously did face in Bali, this sort of information was either inadequate or not acted upon (Walker, 2002). Indeed, White (2002, 254) argues that it is Australia that is out of step with contemporary strategic realities and that far from being an irresponsible free-rider. We can se that the Howard government’s enthusiastic support for the United States generally and for the ‘war on terror’.

Clearly, Australia has a limited capacity to influence American foreign policy. The United States’ present determination to use its overweening power to pursue more narrowly defined and supported objectives means that policy makers in allied countries like Australia need to balance what are debatable short-term domestic pay-offs against the long-term stability of the International system (Beeson, 2003). But in both of the most important elements of its bilateral relationship, economics and security, Asutralia is clearly disadvantaged by America’s willingness to exploit its overwhelming political, economic, and strategic leverage.

 

References:

Beeson, Mark. 2003. Australia’s Relationship with the United States: The Case for Greater Independence. Queensland: Australian Journal of Political Science, University of Queensland

Cheeseman, Graeme. –. Australia: the White Experience of fear and Dependence. –

 

 

 

 

AUSTRALIAN EXTERNAL RELATIONS: SPECIAL RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

 

Devania Anesya/ 070810535

A ustralia has a strategic location and geography since the mid-1980s. Its location isolated from world trouble spots and the fact that it is an island continent are said to provide certain strategic and tactical advantages which is contributed to its defensibility. The Labour government’s 1987 defense White Paper noted that Australia… naturally protected by vast ocean surrounds and the inhospitable tracts of our own country to the north and north-west… combine to provide with natural defences against conventional attack (Beazley, 1987). The 1994 defence White Paper again warned that at some time in the future armed force could be used against us and (so)… we need to be prepared to meet it (White Paper, 1994). This is in spite of the fact that white Australia has never seriously been threatened has said we are unlikely to be for at least the foreseeable future. Such continuing, obsessive, and arguably, irrational fear of military attack has its root in white Australia’s own history and experiences. Australia has always been a frightened country (Renouf, 1979 and Pons, 1994) by the constant fear of attack or conquest by external and predominantly Asian countries. Australia beliefs that she cannot defend herself against these perceived threats, that’s why she led Australia’s policy makers to look to great and powerful friend for reassurance and protection. As a consequence, Australia has become a dependent ally (Bell, 1988), borrowing from and ever supportive of the policies and practices of its principal benefactors, and ready to dispatch military forces overseas in support of their imperial objectives (Andrews, 1979; Millar, 1991; and Watt, 1968). The notion of keeping Australia safe created by maintaining its surrounding region as an Anglo-Australian and later United States-Australian preserve was not restricted to colonial times. It is important to remember that when United States dominance was arguably most legitimate, constructive, and benign in the first couple of decades after the Second World War, it was widely perceived to have assumed a hegemonic position that transcended national interest to provide international public good (Kindleberger, 1973). Since the Second World War, relations with United States have assumed an increasingly prominent position in the construction of economic and security policies in Australia. Sentiment toward the United States has generally been positive. However, self declared ‘war on terrorism’ of United States and Australia’s participation in a conflict with Iraq in particular, has subjected the relationship to widespread scrutiny and criticism. The Australian Labor Party (ALP) has moved to qualify its support, some senior Labor figures have launched fairly splenetic attack on American foreign policy and the Howard government’ support of it (Price, Lewis, and Kerin, 2003). Even before 11 September 2001 and the subsequent reordering of American foreign policy, the Howard government’s expectations about what the bilateral relationship with the United States could deliver looked likely to prove a triumph of hope over experience: a glance at the recent historical record suggested that the benefits likely to accrue to Australia were likely to be the modest at best. But if we examine closer, more exclusive relationship with the United States may have a significant and generally negative impact on Australia’s long term place in the region, its economic position, its political independence, and even domestic security. In economic relations with United States, Australia is one of a select band of countries that actually runs a trade deficit with the United States. While American markets have played a pivotal role in underpinning the export-led development of much of region and more sustaining a faltering global economy through seemingly insatiable consumer-led demand, Australia has not been a major beneficiary of either of these developments. There is a range of visible and invisible trade barriers that discriminate against Australian-based producers (Beeson, 2003). Australia-New Zealand-US alliance, ANZUS was plainly a gesture loaded symbolic than strategic significance, as Australia could add nothing material to America’s overwhelming and increasing military dominance (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002) but it was a gesture that continued an Australian tradition with a respected heritage. Difficult to say anything sensible about the intelligence benefits but with the sort of threat Australians obviously did face in Bali, this sort of information was either inadequate or not acted upon (Walker, 2002). Indeed, White (2002, 254) argues that it is Australia that is out of step with contemporary strategic realities and that far from being an irresponsible free-rider. We can se that the Howard government’s enthusiastic support for the United States generally and for the ‘war on terror’. Clearly, Australia has a limited capacity to influence American foreign policy. The United States’ present determination to use its overweening power to pursue more narrowly defined and supported objectives means that policy makers in allied countries like Australia need to balance what are debatable short-term domestic pay-offs against the long-term stability of the International system (Beeson, 2003). But in both of the most important elements of its bilateral relationship, economics and security, Asutralia is clearly disadvantaged by America’s willingness to exploit its overwhelming political, economic, and strategic leverage.

References:

Beeson, Mark. 2003. Australia’s Relationship with the United States: The Case for Greater Independence. Queensland: Australian Journal of Political Science, University of Queensland Cheeseman, Graeme. –. Australia: the White Experience of fear and Dependence. –

AUSTRALIAN EXTERNAL RELATIONS: RELATIONS WITH INDONESIA, CHINA, AND ITS POSITION IN ASIA

 

Devania Anesya/ 070810535

A

ustralia has always been a frightened country (Renouf, 1979 and Pons, 1994) by the constant fear of attack or conquest by external and predominantly Asian countries. Australia beliefs that she cannot defend herself against these perceived threats, that’s why she led Australia’s policy makers to look to great and powerful friend for reassurance and protection.  As a consequence, Australia has become a dependent ally (Bell, 1988), borrowing from and ever supportive of the policies and practices of its principal benefactors, and ready to dispatch military forces overseas in support of their imperial objectives (Andrews, 1979; Millar, 1991; and Watt, 1968). The notion of keeping Australia safe created by maintaining its surrounding region as an Anglo-Australian and later United States-Australian.

Racial and ethnocentric concerns have informed most of the perceived threats to Australia’s security: initially invasion by ‘yellow hordes’, followed by the fear of communist ‘reds’, and then following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Arab, and Muslim terrorist and religious fanatics. As Jan Pettman has argued, these external fears have been fostered by a process of racialization which predisposes many Australians to associate threat with difference’ and continues to inform dominant assumptions of alliance/ affiliation/ allegiance with the west, and defines our regions against us (Pettman, 1992). Pettman further argues that Australia’s continued fear of invasion may also stem from a sense of guilt that white settlers come with superior military power and seize the land by force, claiming that its occupants were not really using the land productively, might not the more populous and pressured of Asia likewise (Pettman, 1992).

Australia Relations with Indonesia

Australian governments have developed a defense strategy predicated on a threat from and a need for stability in the north, giving observers the impression that Indonesia is a major concern that has loomed large in Australia’s strategic vision (rather than vice versa) (Smith, 2008).

In the past, officials in Australia have worked hard to build a special relationship with Indonesia, which included generous Australian aid, and—in Canberra’s view—tacit support for Indonesia’s acquisition of East Timor. Indonesia has also valued its relationship with Australia. Indonesia even gave Australia a sweetheart deal in divvying up the oil in the Timor Gap, most likely in exchange for Australia’s acquiescence to Indonesia’s controversial absorption of East Timor.

However, because of Australia’s role in the independence of East Timor, Indonesia ended a defense agreement with Australia and relations grew sour (Smith, 2008). In fact, Indonesian leaders have cited Australia as the primary threat to its cohesion, particularly in relation to the troubled province of Papua. Indonesia blamed Australia for the territory’s secession from the Republic. Today, Indonesians believe that Australia is the primary threat to national cohesion.

After September 11 and, especially, the October 12, 2002 Bali bombings that killed eighty-eight Australians, Indonesia figured prominently in Australian security. Australia believes conditions there may pose a threat to its citizens and Australian assets overseas. Australian officials have worked hard to revitalize the relationship. At the functional level there is substantial cooperation. Australia has maintained its aid program and has assisted the Indonesian police in their Bali blast investigations. Restoration of military-tomilitary ties is in the works. Yet Australia has struggled to establish high-level visits. Both Indonesian presidents Wahid and Megawati have cancelled planned trips to Australia, most likely because of nationalist pressures emanating from the Indonesian Parliament and the general public.

In the wake of difficulties to the bilateral relations, both Canberra and Jakarta are trying to restore elements of past cooperation. For example, in the aftermath of the Bali blast, Australian police were instrumental in assisting their Indonesian counterparts in dismantling the culpable Jemaah Islamiyah cells.

For the United States, Australia’s links with Indonesia have always been useful because they helped shore up Indonesia’s security and stability. However, today in the wake of East Timor and Bali, Canberra-Jakarta links are shaken, and the United States needs to be realistic about the limitations of the Australia-Indonesia relationship. Furthermore, Australia’s close alliance with the United States has proven to be a millstone in normalizing Australia- Indonesia relations; many Indonesians see the Untied States as having negative designs on their country for which Australia is a willing partner.

Australia Relations with China

Australia’s first diplomatic mission in China opened in 1941, but closed again only eight years later after the Communist victory over the Nationalist Kuomintang and the subsequent establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Cold War fears of Communism characterised Australia’s relations with China over the next two decades, with Australia refusing to recognise either the Communist government of the PRC in Peking (Beijing) or the Nationalists in the Republic of China (Taiwan) (http://www.naa.gov.au/about-us/publications/fact-sheets/fs247.aspx ).

In 1966, under Prime Minister Harold Holt, a diplomatic mission was established in Taipei. Seven years later, when the Whitlam government established diplomatic relations with the PRC, the Taipei embassy closed and an embassy was opened in Peking (http://www.naa.gov.au/about-us/publications/fact-sheets/fs247.aspx ).

Australia’s relationship with China is documented in records created by the Department of Trade, the Prime Minister Department and within the papers of individual prime ministers including Gough Whitlam and Malcolm Fraser (http://www.naa.gov.au/about-us/publications/fact-sheets/fs247.aspx ).

According to her White Paper, Australia perceive china as the new state with rapid growing economy that must be addressed by Australia elites at the most considerable level. Australia cannot neglect China capabilities and how this will open to a new trade agreement that would benefit Australia. Cooperation between China and Australia is enhanced in the mining and energy sectors. he agreements cover projects worth more than $10 billion in total.Seven of the ten agreements relate to resources and energy. This demonstrates the dynamic relations between the two countries in this sector, and the strong complementarity of the two economies  (Downer, 2005).

 

References:

Cheeseman, Graeme. –. Australia: the White Experience of fear and Dependence. –

Smith, Anthony L. 2008. Australia_indonesia Relations: Getting Beyond East Timor. Hawaii: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (www.apcss.org )

Fact sheet 247 – Australia’s diplomatic relations with China. National Archives of Australia. [Online] n/a n/a, n/a. [Cited: November 23, 2010.] http://www.naa.gov.au/about-us/publications/fact-sheets/fs247.aspx

 

 

AUSTRALIAN POLITICS: NATIONAL POLITICS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND NATIONAL INTEREST

 

Devania Anesya/ 070810535

C hris Baker (2005) reviews Australia as a democratic constitutional monarchy and the great Victorian age of democratic reform. The federal system in which conservative and labour politics are vigorously pursued is the major issues of the day. Australia is a democratic constitutional monarchy with Queen Elizabeth 11 as its current monarch. It is also a federation of the six states which joined together in 1901 as a result of a series of plebiscites. Each of the states has its own constitution and political structure which are broadly similar to that of the national (federal) government. Australians are famously unresponsive about the Constitution – it is tolerated, despised or mildly supported. The Constitution is not an icon of the nation, nor is it part of popular culture. In comparison with the United States the constitution is neither recited nor revered. It is not well known nor apparently well understood. Despite this, Australian democracy has one of the world’s longest continuous histories and has a tough quality which is striking to many visitors. There are two important tasks fulfilled in the Constitution. First, it creates institutions such as the Parliament which is the Queen or the Governor General, the Senate and the House of Representatives and the High Court (which is now the highest court of appeal and the interpreter of the meaning of the Constitution). The Constitution vests powers in those institutions and describes their functions and structures. Importantly, however, the institutions of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet are not mentioned in the Constitution, but are assumed in the conventions and practices of government. So while much of the organization of Australian government is written down some crucial institutions are not described, but rather just assumed. The Constitution contains another important feature in that the Commonwealth government is vested with certain defined powers with the remaining or residual powers resting with the six states. Some powers are shared between the states and the federal governments. Another significant feature of the Constitution is to do with the nature of the Australian federation. Thus the Australian Parliament consists of two houses: the House of Representatives, or people’s house, which is elected on nearly equal electorates and the state’s house or Senate, which consists of twelve elected senators from each of the six states plus two senators from each of the two federal territories. Each house plays a significant role in national politics. There are two major parties – the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the Liberal party of Australia as well as a number of minor parties including the National party, the Australian Democrats and the Greens. These parties function at local state and federal levels. Currently the Liberal party, together with its coalition partner the Nationals, hold power at the federal or national level. The fact that the ALP governs in each of the 6 states and 2 territories illustrates an interesting feature of Australian political life: that Australians tend to elect different political groups into power at state and federal levels. Minor parties and independents have played a growing role in Australian politics although the Australian scene is still dominated by the two major parties. Australian participation in the political processes is underscored by the fact that they go to the polls frequently due to the three levels of elected government (local, state and federal) and the relatively short terms of government (3-4 years at State and Federal levels). The complex nature of the Australian political system is one of its features, with continuous presence of political issues and obligations in the national media. Australia’s policy strategies based on a speech of Ashton Calvert (2003), Secretary Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, is seeking to advance and protect Australia’s interests in the context of environment. The Government is making the most of the unprecedently close relations with the United States to build the basis for an even stronger and more vibrant partnership in the future. Also attach high priority to strengthening the inter-operability of defence forces with those of the United States, to enhancing ADF capabilities through exercises and training with US forces, and to ensuring Australian access to highly sophisticated US military technology. At the same time, Australia and the United States are engaged in the negotiation of a free trade agreement, which is one of the most significant policy initiatives. The FTA will provide improved access and greater certainty in the US market to Australian exporters, including agricultural producers. The Government is also active in looking for ways to further strengthen relations with Japan, China and the Republic of Korea. Japan remains Australia’s largest export market, and is a key interlocutor in diplomacy. July 2003, in Tokyo, Prime Ministers Howard and Koizumi signed a Trade and Economic Framework which charts a course for the future development of trade and economic ties with Japan. Australia has major security, economic and diplomatic interests in South-East Asia. This considerable stake in South-East Asia’s future stability and prosperity to defeat the scourge of terrorism. Since February 2002 Australia have put in place a network of bilateral counter-terrorism arrangements that have strengthened practical cooperation with regional partners including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Cambodia.. Recognising the increasing importance of the European Union in terms of its total political and economic weight and its ability to influence the multilateral agenda, Australia strengthening its policy dialogue with Brussels and the major national capitals on a range of international security, foreign policy, trade and economic, and regulatory issues. The Government is also making a major effort with Papua New Guinea to improve its law and order situation, governance and financial management. And more broadly in the South Pacific, Australia are actively supporting efforts to strengthen regional institutions including, where appropriate, promoting the pooling of resources, to ensure services are both deliverable and sustainable.

References: Baker, Chris. 2005. “Australia Politics” dalam Contemporary Australia. Monash University: National Centre for Australian Studies. Calvert, Ashton. 2003. The Evolving International Environment and Australia’s National Interest. Canbera: Lowy Institute (http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/speeches/department/031126_lowy_institute.html)

AUSTRALIAN IDENTITY

Devania Anesya/ 070810535

Multiculturalism, Australian, and globalization

Australian position in Asia

A

ustralian identity still carries the mark of yesterday’s British connection. For Australian as a whole, Anglo Autralia forms one essential part of series of formations which sustain workable social cohesion for multi-cultural today. These formations include parliaments, courts, churches, educational bodies, trade unions, organizations of civil society and family forms.

By the mid-1990s many such Australians felt real uncertainty about their identity. Sidney Professor of English Elizabeth Webby (1997) said ‘(w)e are the group which has had an identity taken away’. Meanwhile Horne (1994) insist that there is no real Australian identity… there never will be something we called the Australian national identity. Other analysts view Australia as a nation without nationalism and her national identity was fragile, weak, lacking, or absence (Kalantzis, 2000).

Some of the reasons for negativity toward Anglo Australia are historically occupy a declining position in the total Australians population and this may be one reason close in time (Price, 1999). Another reason concerns the effects of the global free market project. Anglo Australians act as a subtle cohesion-promoting and organizing influence in our increasingly complex, dizzily-changing society.

Many decades before its potential for economic and social devastation struck home, about free market, the famous economist Joseph Schumpeter made a prediction that free market capitalism was the most productive and the most dynamic economic system which has ever existed. But because of its extraordinary dynamism, free market capitalism could eventually consume itself because it would destroy the foundation-institution on which it rest.

Ethno-racism is also a major threat to cohesion throughout the world. In Australia, Anglo Australia is one guarantor of social cohesion – only one guarantor, but a major one.

In January 2000, David Malouf, Australia’s leading novelist, took up the theme of attachment to Britishness in Australia. After 150 years of de facto independence, Malouf remark many such Australians still retain a bond emotion of spirit with Britain that upsets many among themselves, especially those who manage our lives and are driven by theories. Malouf argue that after a century of theories and ideas and ideologies, some of them murderous, we might try listening at last to what people have to say, paying attention to what they have to tell.

The bond of emotion and feeling with Britain to which Malouf refers are shared by many ordinary Australians today. They relate to historic institusional, political, and familial ties with Britain and its long history. What we called as multiculturalism in Australia has long been describes by its supporters as an experiment. Ross Tzanes (1999) called Australian multiculturalism as the most exciting social experiment that the modern world has ever seen. Australia’s multiculturalism democracy is a complex ongoing process.

In the 1980s and early 1990s especially, Australian foreign policymaker and opinion leaders directed considerable energy and imaginative geopolitical work into redefining Australia relation with Asia (Evan, – ). Engagement with Asia Australia’s security and well-being – Asia was viewed as essential for Australia’s security

 

References:

Dixson, Miriam. 2002. Identity in Australia: issues and Strategies for the Early to Mid twenty-first Centuury. Armidale: british Australian Studies Association

Pettman, Jan . –. Question of identity: Australia and Asia. –